# A Class of Indices of Equality of a Sport Championship: Definition, Properties and Inference 

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#### Abstract

This paper deals with the measure of equality of a sport championship, where each participant plays against all the others with a home and away match. We define a class of indices derived by normalising some measures of dispersion. Four of such indices are considered and studied: $E Q Q_{1}$ (based on the standard deviation), $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ (Gini's concentration ratio), $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ (mean absolute deviation) and $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ (mean letter spread). We refer to two extreme schemes: the perfect balance and the completely unbalanced position. The distribution of such indices in 30 European national soccer leagues is studied, jointly with the correlation between the indices. Then, a simulation is made, under the hypothesis that the participants have the same level of skill, and some statistical features of the sample distribution are pointed out. Finally, a Beta model is fitted to the sample distribution, and it seems to be an adequate representative.


## 1 Introduction

Sport games are an inexhaustible source of data, and in the recent years have been increasingly accompanied by a thorough statistical support. The peculiar rules of each sport competition have generated a great deal of papers and articles on this subject. In these works, a lot of statistical and probabilistic tools have been applied, such as discrete and continuous distributions, stochastic processes, logistic regression, graphical models, and so on. We can mention, for instance, the following contributions, related to some popular sports:

[^0]- General: Mosteller (1952), David (1959), Glenn (1960), Jackson (1994).
- Athletic: Blest (1996), Morton (1997), Grubb (1998), Cox and Dunn (2002).
- Baseball: Boronico (1999).
- Basketball: Carlin (1996), Schwertmann et al. (1996).
- Cricket: Kimber (1993), Preston and Thomas (2000, 2002).
- Football/Soccer: Maher (1982), Croucher (1984, 1994), Pollard (1986), Nevill et al. (1996), Dixon and Coles (1997), Wright (1997), Dixon and Robinson (1998), Rue and Salvesen (2000), Koning (2000).
- Golf: Holder and Nevill (1997), Ketzscher and Ringrose (2002).
- Tennis: Holder and Nevill (1997), Jackson and Mosurski (1997), Magnus and Klaassen (1999a, 1999b).

Let us now focus our attention on a sport championship, in which each participant plays against every other one, with a double match (home and away). Usually, but not always, this pattern is used in team sports rather than in individual ones. We are intended to apply our indices to soccer games, so we will consider the recent rule of assigning a team three points when it wins, one if it draws, no points if it loses. Generally, the championship is considered more interesting when it is well-balanced, and the result of each game is uncertain. We propose here four simple normalised indices of equality: they are equal to one if the championship is perfectly well-balanced, and each team gains the same final number of points; on the other side, each index is equal to zero if the final position is completely unbalanced. This happens when the first classified team wins all the matches, the second classified wins all the matches but two (it loses only when playing against the first team), the third wins all the matches except when playing against the first and the second, and so on, until we consider the last team, which always loses. We will denote this limit scheme with CUP (Completely Unbalanced Position).

Let $n$ be the number of participants and $P j$ the score of the $j$-th classified team.Under the 3-1-0 rule, the total number Tn of points depends on the total number of draws. If there are no draws at all, we have three points for each match, so the total score will be:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T_{n}(\max )=3 n(n-1) \tag{1.1a}
\end{equation*}
$$

On the opposite side, if all the matches finish with a draw, the total score is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T_{n}(\min )=2 n(n-1) \tag{1.1b}
\end{equation*}
$$

If the final position is perfectly balanced, each team has the same number of points $\mathrm{Tn} / \mathrm{n}$, which is included in the interval [2(n-1), $3(\mathrm{n}-1)]$. Under the CUP, the winner has a final score of $6(n-1)$ points, the second gets $6(n-2)$ points, the $j$-th gets $6(\mathrm{n}-\mathrm{j})$ and so on. We have then two extreme patterns for the final position:

Perfect equality: $P_{j}=T_{n} / n, \forall j$
Maximum unbalance (CUP): $P_{j}=6(n-j), j=1,2,3 \ldots, n$

We propose and develop here three normalised indices of equality, which are equal to zero under (1.3) and to one under (1.2).

## 2 Indices of equality

It is very well known that a dispersion measure $V$, whose value lies between a minimum $V^{\prime}$ and a maximum $V^{\prime \prime}$, may be normalised by applying the linear transformation:

$$
\begin{equation*}
V^{*}=\frac{V-V^{\prime}}{V^{\prime}-V^{\prime}}=\frac{V}{R(V)}-\frac{V^{\prime}}{R(V)} \tag{2.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $R(V)=V^{\prime}-V^{\prime}$ is the maximum range of $V$.
When $V^{\prime}=0$, the formula (2.1) becomes simply $V^{*}=\frac{V}{V^{\prime \prime}}$.
We will then define a generic index of equality by choosing a measure of dispersion, normalise it by (2.1) and subtract the result from the value 1 . If V is a regular measure of dispersion, equal to zero in absence of dispersion, we will define the corresponding index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}(\mathrm{V})$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
E Q(V)=1-\frac{V}{V \max } \tag{2.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

We have considered and studied here four indices of equality belonging to the above defined class (2.2):

$$
\begin{equation*}
E Q_{1}=1-\frac{S D}{\max \mathrm{~S} D} \tag{2.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $S D$ is the standard deviation of the final position.

$$
\begin{equation*}
E Q_{2}=1-\frac{R}{\max R} \tag{2.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $R$ is the Gini concentration ratio of the final scores.

$$
\begin{equation*}
E Q_{3}=1-\frac{M A D}{\operatorname{max~MAD}} \tag{2.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $M A D$ is the mean absolute deviation about the median $\hat{m}$, and finally

$$
\begin{equation*}
E Q_{4}=1-\frac{M L S^{*}}{\max \mathrm{MLS}^{*}} \tag{2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

where MLS denotes the mean letter spread, which is the average of the letter spreads (Hoaglin, 1985), which are the differences of the corresponding letter values ( $\mathrm{G}^{+}-\mathrm{G}^{-}, \mathrm{F}^{+}-\mathrm{F}^{-}$etc.). We have calculated a modified version of the MLS, in which we include the G letter spread (Brizzi, 2000) and exclude the last but one letter spread, in order to reduce the weight of the extreme observations. We decided to exclude the last but one because it repeats the same information of the previous and following letter spreads.

Example: consider a CUP with $\mathrm{n}=9$ : the data are then:
48-42-36-30-24-18-12-6-0. Letter values and letter spreads are:
H (median): 24
G values: 30 and $18 \rightarrow G$ spread $=12$
$F$ values: 36 and $12 \rightarrow F$ spread $=24$
E values: 42 and $6 \rightarrow$ E spread $=36$
D values: 45 and $3 \rightarrow$ D spread $=42$
$C$ values: 48 and $0 \rightarrow C$ spread $=48$.
The mean letter spread is then:
$M L S=\frac{12+24+36+42+48}{5}=\frac{162}{5}=32.4$

The modified MLS is calculated by excluding the D letter spread, which is the half sum of the $E$ and $C$ ones:
$M L S^{*}=\frac{12+24+36+48}{4}=\frac{120}{4}=30$.

## 3 Maximisation and normalisation

If we want to specify the maxima and to give an explicit expression of the indices proposed here, we need to study the behaviour of each index in the extreme situations (1.2) and (1.3). Sometimes the results, as shown below, are slightly different for even and odd values of $n$. It is very easy to check what happens under (1.2): SD, R, MAD and MLS* are all equal to zero, and the corresponding indices of equality are equal to one.

Let now consider the CUP for deriving the maximum. We start with the index EQ1, based on the standard deviation (SD), which is equal to zero under the condition (1.1). We need then to calculate the maximum of SD, which corresponds to (1.2) situation; as said before, under the CUP the average score is $3(\mathrm{n}-1)$.
$\max S D=\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n}[6(n-j)-3(n-1)]^{2}}{\mathrm{n}}}=\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n}[3(n-2 j+1)]^{2}}{\mathrm{n}}}=$

$$
\begin{equation*}
=\sqrt{3(n+1)[3(n+1)-6(n+1)+2(2 n+1)]}=\sqrt{3(n+1)(n-1)} \tag{3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The index $E Q_{1}$ is then defined this way:

$$
\begin{equation*}
E Q_{1}=1-\frac{S D}{\sqrt{3(n+1)(n-1)}} \tag{3.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

We have also to calculate the maximum of R , i.e. the value of the Gini concentration ratio under the maximum unbalanced situation. Let p' $1, p^{\prime} 2, \ldots, p^{\prime} n$ be the number of points of each team, arranged in an increasing order. The easiest formula for R (Brizzi, 1996, pag. 52) is the following:

$$
\begin{equation*}
R=1-\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} q_{i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \frac{i}{n}}=1-\frac{2 \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} q_{i}}{n-1}, \text { where } q_{i}=\frac{p_{1}^{\prime}+p_{2}^{\prime}+\ldots+p_{i}^{\prime}}{3 n(n-1)} \tag{3.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Under the CUP, the value of $q_{i}$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
q_{i}=\frac{0+6+\ldots+6(i-1)}{3 n(n-1)}=\frac{3(i-1) i}{3 n(n-1)}=\frac{i(i-1)}{n(n-1)} . \tag{3.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

The corresponding value of $R$ is then:

$$
\begin{gather*}
\max R=1-\frac{2 \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \frac{i(i-1)}{n(n-1)}}{n-1}=1-\frac{2 \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} i(i-1)}{n(n-1)^{2}}= \\
=1-\frac{2}{n(n-1)^{2}}\left(\frac{n(n-1)(2 n-1)}{6}-\frac{n(n-1)}{2}\right)=1-\frac{1}{n-1}\left(\frac{2 n-1}{3}-1\right)= \\
=1-\frac{1}{n-1}\left(\frac{2(n-2)}{3}\right)=1-\frac{2}{3}\left(\frac{n-2}{n-1}\right)=\frac{n+1}{3(n-1)} . \tag{3.5}
\end{gather*}
$$

The index of equality based on R is therefore:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{EQ}_{2}=1-\frac{R}{\max R}=1-\frac{3(n-1)}{n+1} R \tag{3.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

The third index is based on the MAD. Under the situation (1.3), the median is equal to the average (the CUP is symmetric), i.e. to $3(n-1)$. The maximum value of MAD differs, depending on $n$ being even or odd.

Let n be even, then $\mathrm{n}=2 \mathrm{~h}$, with h a positive integer. We have then:

$$
\begin{gather*}
\max M A D=\frac{1}{2 h} \sum_{j=1}^{2 h}|6(2 h-j)-3(2 h-1)|=\frac{3}{2 h} \sum_{j=1}^{2 h}|2 h-2 j+1|= \\
=\frac{3}{2 h} \sum_{j=1}^{h}(2 h-2 j+1)+\frac{3}{2 h} \sum_{j=h+1}^{2 h}(2 j-2 h-1)=\frac{3}{2 h}\left[\sum_{j=h+1}^{2 h} 2 j-\sum_{j=1}^{h} 2 j\right]= \\
=\frac{3}{2 h}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{2 h} 2 j-2 \sum_{j=1}^{h} 2 j\right]=\frac{3}{2 h}[2 h(2 h-1)-2 h(h-1)]=3(2 h-1)-3(h-1)=3 h=\frac{3}{2} n \tag{3.7}
\end{gather*}
$$

Let now n be odd, then $\mathrm{n}=2 \mathrm{~h}+1$, with h a positive integer. The maximum value of MAD becomes:

$$
\begin{gather*}
\max M A D=\frac{1}{2 h+1} \sum_{j=1}^{2 h+1}|6(2 h+1-j)-6 h|=\frac{6}{2 h+1} \sum_{j=1}^{2 h+1}|h+1-j|= \\
=\frac{6}{2 h+1}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{h}(h+1-j)-\sum_{j=h+2}^{2 h+1}(h+1-j)\right]=\frac{6}{2 h+1}\left[\sum_{j=h+2}^{2 h+1} j-\sum_{j=1}^{h} j\right]= \\
=\frac{6}{2 h+1}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{2 h+1} j-\sum_{j=1}^{h+1} j-\sum_{j=1}^{h} j\right]=\frac{6}{2 h+1}\left[\frac{(2 h+1)(2 h+2)}{2}-\frac{(h+1)(h+2)}{2}-\frac{h(h+1)}{2}\right]= \\
=\frac{3(h+1)}{2 h+1}[2(2 h+1)-(h+2)-h]=\frac{3 h(2 h+2)}{2 h+1}=\frac{3}{2}\left(n-\frac{1}{n}\right) \tag{3.8}
\end{gather*}
$$

The index EQ3 is then defined this way:

$$
\mathrm{EQ}_{3}=1-\frac{M A D}{\max M A D}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
1-\frac{3 \cdot M A D}{2 n} \text { if } n \text { is even }  \tag{3.9}\\
1-\frac{3 \cdot M A D}{2\left(n-\frac{1}{n}\right)} \text { if } n \text { is odd }
\end{array}\right.
$$

Finally, we considered the fourth index $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$. Since it is not easy to find an univoque expression for the maximum, we have calculated the value of the modified MLS (indicated with MLS*) under the CUP, for $n$ between 10 and 20,
which is the range that includes the value of $n$ in the great majority of actual sport championships. The resulting maxima are reported in the following table:

Table 1: Maximum value of MLS* for each value of n between 10 and 20.

| $\mathbf{N}$ | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| max MLS* $^{*}$ | 36 | 39 | 43.5 | 45 | 51 | 54 | 58.5 | 64.8 | 70.8 | 74.4 | 79.2 |

Table 2: National Soccer Leagues 1998/99: indices of equality.

| Country | $\mathbf{n}$ | EQ $_{1}$ | Rank | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{2}}$ | Rank | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{3}}$ | Rank | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{4}}$ | Rank |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sweden | 14 | 0.730 | 1 | 0.707 | 1 | 0.755 | 1 | 0.743 | 1 |
| Czech Rep. | 16 | 0.658 | 2 | 0.638 | 2 | 0.698 | 2 | 0.675 | 2 |
| Germany | 18 | 0.657 | 3 | 0.544 | 10 | 0.690 | 3 | 0.588 | 9 |
| Italy | 18 | 0.622 | 4 | 0.605 | 3 | 0.656 | 4 | 0.630 | 3 |
| Spain | 20 | 0.617 | 5 | 0.586 | 4 | 0.615 | 9 | 0.615 | 5 |
| England | 20 | 0.606 | 6 | 0.583 | 5 | 0.652 | 6 | 0.619 | 4 |
| Switzer. | 12 | 0.596 | 7 | 0.553 | 8 | 0.611 | 10 | 0.612 | 6 |
| Russia | 16 | 0.583 | 8 | 0.580 | 6 | 0.656 | 5 | 0.611 | 7 |
| France | 18 | 0.579 | 9 | 0.562 | 7 | 0.623 | 7 | 0.602 | 8 |
| Wales | 17 | 0.574 | 10 | 0.474 | 14 | 0.592 | 13 | 0.522 | 16 |
| Poland | 16 | 0.552 | 11 | 0.547 | 9 | 0.620 | 8 | 0.583 | 10 |
| Ireland | 12 | 0.529 | 12 | 0.519 | 12 | 0.593 | 12 | 0.560 | 11 |
| Turkey | 18 | 0.524 | 13 | 0.523 | 11 | 0.597 | 11 | 0.554 | 12 |
| Portugal | 18 | 0.511 | 14 | 0.474 | 15 | 0.556 | 15 | 0.531 | 13 |
| Hungary | 18 | 0.507 | 15 | 0.482 | 13 | 0.549 | 16 | 0.528 | 14 |
| Holland | 18 | 0.504 | 16 | 0.464 | 17 | 0.504 | 19 | 0.508 | 17 |
| Belgium | 18 | 0.487 | 17 | 0.450 | 18 | 0.494 | 20 | 0.497 | 18 |
| Norway | 14 | 0.479 | 18 | 0.471 | 16 | 0.558 | 14 | 0.522 | 15 |
| Israel | 16 | 0.444 | 19 | 0.434 | 20 | 0.516 | 17 | 0.474 | 20 |
| Ukraine | 16 | 0.439 | 20 | 0.410 | 21 | 0.479 | 21 | 0.451 | 22 |
| Croatia | 12 | 0.438 | 21 | 0.445 | 19 | 0.505 | 18 | 0.489 | 19 |
| Macedonia | 14 | 0.437 | 22 | 0.408 | 22 | 0.459 | 24 | 0.456 | 21 |
| Belarus | 15 | 0.433 | 23 | 0.400 | 23 | 0.461 | 22 | 0.440 | 24 |
| Bulgaria | 16 | 0.403 | 24 | 0.395 | 24 | 0.461 | 23 | 0.440 | 23 |
| Georgia | 16 | 0.394 | 25 | 0.359 | 26 | 0.443 | 25 | 0.406 | 25 |
| Greece | 18 | 0.390 | 26 | 0.365 | 25 | 0.424 | 26,5 | 0.401 | 26 |
| Romania | 18 | 0.367 | 27 | 0.351 | 27 | 0.424 | 26,5 | 0.373 | 27 |
| Slovakia | 16 | 0.365 | 28 | 0.325 | 28 | 0.385 | 28 | 0.370 | 28 |
| Luxemb. | 12 | 0.344 | 29 | 0.319 | 29 | 0.310 | 29 | 0.336 | 29 |
| Cyprus | 14 | 0.255 | 30 | 0.232 | 30 | 0.282 | 30 | 0.314 | 30 |

## 4 Application to European soccer data

We have applied the indices of equality $E Q_{1}, E Q_{2}, E Q_{3}, E Q_{4}$ to a set of soccer data, and more precisely to the final positions of 30 European National Soccer Leagues (including Cyprus, Israel and Turkey) in 1998/99 season. In Table 2 we have reported the name of the Country, the number of teams $n$, the equality indices and the corresponding rank ( 1 for the first, 30 for the last).

Swedish national league ( 14 teams) seems to be the most balanced, since it shows the highest value of all the indices, followed by the Czech Republic (16 teams), while the most unbalanced national leagues, with respect to all the indices, are held in Cyprus and Luxembourg

We have then studied the degree of association of the indices in this set of 30 data, by computing the Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficient r and the Spearman rank correlation index $r_{S}$ between each pair of indices, in order to verify the degree of consistency between the indices. We have obtained the following correlation matrices:

Table 3: Linear correlation between the indices of equality (Bravais-Pearson coefficient).

|  | $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ | $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ | $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ | $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ | 1.000 | 0.973 | 0.973 | 0.973 |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ |  | 1.000 | 0.974 | 0.994 |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ |  |  | 1.000 | 0.975 |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ |  |  |  | 1.000 |

Table 4: Rank correlation between the indices of equality (Spearman coefficient).

|  | $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ | $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ | $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ | $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ | 1.000 | 0.977 | 0.974 | 0.976 |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ |  | 1.000 | 0.972 | 0.994 |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ |  |  | 1.000 | 0.970 |
| $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ |  |  |  | 1.000 |

Therefore, the information given by the four indices about the degree of equality is quite similar. In particular, EQ2 and EQ4 have a correlation very close
to one; so, they seem to be almost equivalent. The remaining 5 pairs of indices show almost the same level of correlation, about 0.975 (i.e. 39/40).

## 5 Sample distribution of the indices

Finally, we tried to study the sample distribution of the indices defined above. We simulated with GAUSS package 25,000 soccer championships for each value of $k$ and for each index of equality. We worked under the simple hypothesis that all the participants have the same level of skill, and took into consideration the "home advantage", which is very relevant in European soccer, giving a probability of 5/8 to the event "home team wins", $1 / 4$ to the event "draw match", $1 / 8$ to the event "guest team wins". These probabilities are quite suitable to the real soccer world, at least according to our set of data.

### 5.1 Index EQ1 based on standard deviation

In Table 5 we show some statistical features of the simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$, for some values of $n$ between 10 and 20 (all the $n$ 's reported in Table 1 are included in this range): average, standard deviation, median and some tail percentiles.

Table 5: Simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$.

|  | Aver. | StD. | Median | Left tail percentiles |  | Right tail percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{n}$ | $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}} \mathbf{( n )}$ | $\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{1}} \mathbf{( n )}$ | $\mathbf{M e}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5} \%$ | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 0.7413 | 0.0615 | 0.7438 | 0.587 | 0.614 | 0.636 | 0.838 | 0.854 | 0.872 |
| $\mathbf{1 2}$ | 0.7613 | 0.0511 | 0.7627 | 0.637 | 0.658 | 0.675 | 0.842 | 0.857 | 0.873 |
| $\mathbf{1 3}$ | 0.7695 | 0.0473 | 0.7712 | 0.654 | 0.672 | 0.690 | 0.845 | 0.858 | 0.872 |
| $\mathbf{1 4}$ | 0.7766 | 0.0438 | 0.7781 | 0.670 | 0.687 | 0.702 | 0.847 | 0.859 | 0.872 |
| $\mathbf{1 5}$ | 0.7838 | 0.0413 | 0.7851 | 0.681 | 0.699 | 0.714 | 0.850 | 0.861 | 0.873 |
| $\mathbf{1 6}$ | 0.7897 | 0.0387 | 0.7912 | 0.695 | 0.711 | 0.724 | 0.851 | 0.862 | 0.874 |
| $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 0.8010 | 0.0342 | 0.8018 | 0.717 | 0.731 | 0.744 | 0.856 | 0.865 | 0.877 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ | 0.8103 | 0.0308 | 0.8110 | 0.736 | 0.747 | 0.758 | 0.859 | 0.868 | 0.878 |

We can use the tail percentiles of Table 5 as critical values for testing the null hypothesis that all the participants have the same technical level, and consequently the probability of winning a game depends only on the home factor. The simulated sample distribution of $E Q_{1}$ is plotted in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Sample distribution of $E Q_{1 .}$

### 5.2 Index $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ based on Gini concentration ratio

In Table 6 we give some statistical features of the simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$, for some values of $n$ between 10 and 20 (all the $n$ 's reported in Table 1 are included in this range): average, standard deviation, median and some tail percentiles.

Table 6: Simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $E Q_{2}$.

|  | Aver. | StD | Median | Left tail percentiles |  | Right tail percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{n}$ | $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{1}} \mathbf{( n )}$ | $\mathbf{M e}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5} \%$ | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 0.7298 | 0.0646 | 0.7317 | 0.570 | 0.596 | 0.619 | 0.832 | 0.850 | 0.868 |
| $\mathbf{1 2}$ | 0.7508 | 0.0541 | 0.7527 | 0.618 | 0.640 | 0.658 | 0.836 | 0.850 | 0.865 |
| $\mathbf{1 3}$ | 0.7583 | 0.0498 | 0.7602 | 0.634 | 0.655 | 0.673 | 0.837 | 0.850 | 0.865 |
| $\mathbf{1 4}$ | 0.7656 | 0.0469 | 0.7675 | 0.650 | 0.669 | 0.685 | 0.839 | 0.852 | 0.866 |
| $\mathbf{1 5}$ | 0.7724 | 0.0435 | 0.7736 | 0.665 | 0.684 | 0.698 | 0.841 | 0.854 | 0.867 |
| $\mathbf{1 6}$ | 0.7789 | 0.0411 | 0.7804 | 0.679 | 0.696 | 0.710 | 0.844 | 0.855 | 0.869 |
| $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 0.7897 | 0.0366 | 0.7909 | 0.698 | 0.715 | 0.727 | 0.848 | 0.858 | 0.869 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ | 0.8001 | 0.0333 | 0.8012 | 0.718 | 0.732 | 0.743 | 0.853 | 0.862 | 0.872 |

We can also use the tail percentiles of Table 5 as critical values for testing the null hypothesis that all the participants have are at the same level, and consequently the probability of winning a game depends only on the home factor. The simulated sample distribution of $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ is plotted in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Sample distribution of $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$

### 5.3 Index $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ based on mean absolute deviation

In Table 7 we report some statistical features of the simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$, for some values of $n$ between 10 and 20 (all the $n$ 's reported in Table 1 lie in this range): average, standard deviation, median and some tail percentiles.

As done before, we can use the tail percentiles of Table 7 as critical values for testing the null hypothesis that all the participants have the same technical level, and consequently the probability of winning a game depends only on the home factor. The simulated sample distribution of $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ is plotted in Figure 3.

Table 7: Simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$.

|  | Aver. | StD | Median | Left tail percentiles |  | Right tail percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{n}$ | $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{M e}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 0.6443 | 0.0900 | 0.6500 | 0.420 | 0.450 | 0.490 | 0.780 | 0.810 | 0.830 |
| $\mathbf{1 2}$ | 0.6708 | 0.0750 | 0.6736 | 0.486 | 0.514 | 0.542 | 0.785 | 0.806 | 0.826 |
| $\mathbf{1 3}$ | 0.6813 | 0.0701 | 0.6845 | 0.500 | 0.536 | 0.560 | 0.792 | 0.810 | 0.827 |
| $\mathbf{1 4}$ | 0.6924 | 0.0645 | 0.6939 | 0.525 | 0.556 | 0.582 | 0.791 | 0.811 | 0.826 |
| $\mathbf{1 5}$ | 0.7014 | 0.0604 | 0.7054 | 0.549 | 0.576 | 0.598 | 0.795 | 0.808 | 0.826 |
| $\mathbf{1 6}$ | 0.7102 | 0.0563 | 0.7109 | 0.570 | 0.594 | 0.613 | 0.797 | 0.812 | 0.828 |
| $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 0.7251 | 0.0507 | 0.7284 | 0.599 | 0.620 | 0.639 | 0.806 | 0.818 | 0.833 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ | 0.7386 | 0.0453 | 0.7400 | 0.625 | 0.645 | 0.660 | 0.810 | 0.822 | 0.838 |



Figure 3: Sample distribution of $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$.

### 5.4 Index $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ based on mean letter spread

We have given in Table 8 some statistical features of the simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$, for some values of $n$ between 10 and 20
(all the $n$ 's reported in Table 1 are included in this range): average, standard deviation, median and some tail percentiles.

Table 8: Simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$.

|  | Aver. | $\mathbf{S t D}$ | Median | Left tail percentiles |  | Right tail percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{n}$ | $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{S ( n )}$ | $\mathbf{M e}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 0.7606 | 0.0595 | 0.7639 | 0.611 | 0.639 | 0.660 | 0.854 | 0.868 | 0.882 |
| $\mathbf{1 2}$ | 0.7741 | 0.0502 | 0.7759 | 0.649 | 0.670 | 0.690 | 0.853 | 0.868 | 0.879 |
| $\mathbf{1 3}$ | 0.7822 | 0.0461 | 0.7833 | 0.664 | 0.686 | 0.703 | 0.856 | 0.868 | 0.881 |
| $\mathbf{1 4}$ | 0.7878 | 0.0430 | 0.7892 | 0.681 | 0.699 | 0.716 | 0.855 | 0.868 | 0.880 |
| $\mathbf{1 5}$ | 0.7930 | 0.0404 | 0.7940 | 0.692 | 0.711 | 0.725 | 0.856 | 0.868 | 0.880 |
| $\mathbf{1 6}$ | 0.7972 | 0.0379 | 0.7970 | 0.703 | 0.720 | 0.733 | 0.857 | 0.868 | 0.880 |
| $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 0.8079 | 0.0338 | 0.8079 | 0.726 | 0.740 | 0.751 | 0.862 | 0.870 | 0.881 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ | 0.8142 | 0.0307 | 0.8150 | 0.739 | 0.752 | 0.762 | 0.864 | 0.872 | 0.883 |

We can use the tail percentiles of Table 8 as critical values for testing the null hypothesis that all the participants have the same technical level, and consequently the probability of winning a game depends only on the home factor. The simulated sample distribution of $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ is plotted in Figure 4.


Figure 4: Sample distribution of $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$

We have finally tried to see what would happen without the "home advantage": in Table 9 we have shown the results of the index $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ by giving the same probability to each possible outcome (home wins, draw match, guest wins).

Table 9: Simulated sample distribution of the index of equality $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$.

|  | Aver. | StD | Median | Left tail percentiles |  | Right tail percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{n}$ | $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{M e}_{\mathbf{1}}(\mathbf{n})$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5} \%$ | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 0.7023 | 0.0686 | 0.7044 | 0.534 | 0.561 | 0.586 | 0.812 | 0.830 | 0.849 |
| $\mathbf{1 2}$ | 0.7250 | 0.0578 | 0.7270 | 0.581 | 0.606 | 0.627 | 0.817 | 0.833 | 0.851 |
| $\mathbf{1 3}$ | 0.7335 | 0.0533 | 0.7353 | 0.604 | 0.625 | 0.643 | 0.818 | 0.834 | 0.849 |
| $\mathbf{1 4}$ | 0.7421 | 0.0499 | 0.7443 | 0.620 | 0.639 | 0.657 | 0.821 | 0.835 | 0.849 |
| $\mathbf{1 5}$ | 0.7502 | 0.0466 | 0.7516 | 0.639 | 0.656 | 0.671 | 0.825 | 0.838 | 0.852 |
| $\mathbf{1 6}$ | 0.7572 | 0.0437 | 0.7585 | 0.650 | 0.669 | 0.684 | 0.828 | 0.840 | 0.852 |
| $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 0.7697 | 0.0393 | 0.7710 | 0.674 | 0.689 | 0.703 | 0.832 | 0.843 | 0.855 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ | 0.7810 | 0.0353 | 0.7818 | 0.698 | 0.710 | 0.721 | 0.838 | 0.847 | 0.859 |

If we compare Table 5 and Table 9 we can notice that the general trend does not seem to change dramatically. The average values are proportionally lower when eliminating the home advantage (about $5 \%$ less), while the standard deviation increases (from $12 \%$ to $15 \%$ depending on $n$ ), and this is not surprising if we consider that the probabilities $(1 / 3,1 / 3,1 / 3)$ given in Table 9 to the possible outcomes of a game are more heterogeneous than $(5 / 8,2 / 8,1 / 8)$ given before. The same happens with the other indices.

### 5.5 Analysis and comparison of the sample distributions

Looking at the results, we have observed that the sample average of each index of equality increases with $n$ following an approximately linear pattern, while the sample standard deviation is almost perfectly proportional to $n$. Actually, if we fit the recorded sample average of each index with a least squares straight line, we have the following results:
$\mathrm{M}_{1} *(\mathrm{n})=0,6793+0,0068 \mathrm{n}(\mathrm{r}=+0,989)$
$\mathrm{M} 2 *(\mathrm{n})=0,6672+0,0069 \mathrm{n}(\mathrm{r}=+0,990)$
M3 ${ }^{*}(\mathrm{n})=0,5585+0,0093 \mathrm{n}(\mathrm{r}=+0,991)$
$\mathrm{M} 4 *(\mathrm{n})=0,7100+0,0054 \mathrm{n}(\mathrm{r}=+0,990)$,
where $M_{i} *(n), i=1,2,3,4$ are the theoretical mean values, which are actually not far from the observed ones, and the values of $r_{i}$, all very close to one, give us
even more evidence that the relation between $n$ and $M_{i}(n)$ may be satisfactorily represented with a linear model.

Referring now to the sample standard deviation $S_{i}(n)$ of the simulated values, we noticed that the product $n \cdot S_{i}(n)$ is approximately constant for each $i$. We can then define a simple but satisfactory approximation for the standard deviation, by using the following expressions:

$$
\begin{align*}
& S_{1} *(n)=\frac{0.616}{n} \cong \frac{8}{13 n} .  \tag{5.5}\\
& S_{2} *(n)=\frac{0.655}{n} \cong \frac{15}{23 n}  \tag{5.6}\\
& S_{3} *(n)=\frac{0.905}{n} \cong \frac{19}{21 n}  \tag{5.7}\\
& S_{4} *(n)=\frac{0.605}{n} \cong \frac{17}{28 n} \tag{5.8}
\end{align*}
$$

Finally, if we consider the tail percentiles shown in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 as critical values for a statistical test where the null hypothesis is that all the teams have the same probability to win a game, the only country for which all the indices of equality lead us to keep the null hypothesis is Sweden.

## 6 Fitting the sample distribution with a Beta model

Now, we have tried to fit the sample distributions to the standard two-parameters Beta model:
$f(y)=\frac{y^{p-1}(1-y)^{q-1}}{B(p, q)}, p>0, q>0, \quad 0<y<1$.

The normalising constant $B(p, q)$ in (6.1) is equal to:
$B(p, q)=\int_{0}^{1} y^{p-1}(1-y)^{q-1} d y=\frac{\Gamma(p) \Gamma(q)}{\Gamma(p+q)}$

If $p$ and $q$ are both integer numbers, we have:
$B(p, q)=\frac{(p-1)!(q-1)!}{(p+q-1)!}$
We considered even values of $n$ from 10 to 20 , estimated $p$ and $q$ with the method of moments, rounded the result to the nearest half, in order to have an
easier task in calculating the Beta operator, and reported the estimates $\hat{p}, \hat{q}$ in Table 10. The estimators are:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\hat{\alpha}=\frac{\bar{y}\left(\bar{y}-m_{2}\right)}{s^{2}} ; \hat{\beta}=\frac{(1-\bar{y})\left(\bar{y}-m_{2}\right)}{s^{2}} \tag{6.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\bar{y}$ is the sample average, $s^{2}$ is the sample variance and $m_{2}$ is the sample moment of the second order $\left(m_{2}=\bar{y}^{2}+s^{2}\right)$.

Table 10: Estimates of the Beta parameters for different values of $n$.

|  | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{1}}$ |  | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{2}}$ |  | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{3}}$ |  | $\mathbf{E Q}_{\mathbf{4}}$ |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{n}$ | $\hat{p}$ | $\hat{q}$ | $\hat{p}$ | $\hat{q}$ | $\hat{p}$ | $\hat{q}$ | $\hat{p}$ | $\hat{q}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 37 | 13 | 34 | 12.5 | 18 | 10 | 38 | 12 |
| $\mathbf{1 2}$ | 51 | 16 | 48 | 16 | 25,5 | 12,5 | 53 | 15.5 |
| $\mathbf{1 4}$ | 70 | 20 | 62 | 19 | 34 | 15 | 70.5 | 19 |
| $\mathbf{1 6}$ | 86.5 | 23 | 79 | 22.5 | 45.5 | 18.5 | 90 | 23 |
| $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 109 | 27 | 97.5 | 26 | 55.5 | 21 | 109 | 26 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ | 132 | 31 | 116 | 29 | 68 | 24 | 131 | 30 |

Looking at Table 10, we notice that the estimated values of the Beta parameters increase almost linearly as $n$ increases, and that the distribution is almost equal for the three indices. We have plotted the empirical frequency function jointly with the correspondent Beta theoretical function, and we saw that it fits very well. In the following figures we have represented the empirical and theoretical distribution for $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ and $k=10$ (Figure 5), for $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ and $k=12$ (Figure 6), for $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ and $k=14$ (Figure 7), for $\mathrm{EQ}_{4}$ and $k=16$ (Figure 8). Looking at the figures, it is evident that Beta model can be considered quite appropriate for the sample distribution of the indices, and that estimation based on moments gives in this context very good results.


Figure 5: Empirical and theoretical Beta d.f.: $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ with $\mathrm{n}=10$.


Figure 6: Empirical and theoretical Beta d.f.: $\mathrm{EQ}_{2}$ with $\mathrm{n}=12$.


Figure 7: Empirical and theoretical Beta d.f.: $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ with $\mathrm{n}=14$.


Figure 8: Empirical and theoretical Beta d.f.: $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ with $\mathrm{n}=16$.

## 7 Concluding remarks

Considering the results described above, we can conclude that all the indices of equality give similar (and strongly correlated) results in measuring the equality of a sport championship. Since we are looking for a "quick" index, perhaps $\mathrm{EQ}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{EQ}_{3}$ are preferable, being easier to calculate. The soccer data show that a "good level" of equality is reached when the indices are greater than 0.6 , and this is frequently associated with a high technical level: countries like Spain, Italy, France, England, Germany, where the technical level is outstanding, show high values for all the indices. On the other side, countries which do not have a good soccer tradition, like Cyprus and Luxembourg, show the lowest values, like recent countries such as Belarus and Slovakia, whose best teams participated to other leagues in the past.

The simulated sample distribution of each of the indices, under the condition of equal level of all the competing teams, shows increasing values of the sample mean as $n$ increases, while the standard deviation decreases. The link between $n$ and the sample mean is well fitted by a straight line, see (5.1),(5.2),(5.3),(5.4); the sample standard deviation is approximately proportional to inverse of $n$, as shown in (5.4), (5.5) and Table 9. The tail percentiles indicated in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 may be used as critical values of a test of significance (the null hypothesis is the perfect equality of the level). The Beta model, whose parameters may be estimated with a simple method (like the method of moments) seems very suitable for representing the sample distribution, as shown in Chapter 6.

The next step on this research topic should be an extension of the study of the sample distribution, under different conditions (not only the equal level), and/or an analytical approach to this study, beginning with a small number of participants to facilitate the analysis; other indices of equality may be proposed as well, by considering other measures of dispersion and applying (2.2). A possible extension of this procedure may be as well to study the equality of the participants by taking into account not only the number of points, but also the number of goals scored in each match: indeed, scores like 2-1 and 7-0, yield the same number of points to both teams in the final position, but give a completely different impression about their level of skill.

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